The belief-weighted Nash social welfare functions are methods for aggregating Savage preferences de…ned over a set of acts. Each such method works as follows. Fix a 0-normalized subjective expected utility representation of every possible preference and assign a vector of individual weights to each pro…le of beliefs. To compute the social preference at a given preference pro…le, rank the acts according to the weighted product of the individual 0-normalized subjective expected utilities they yield, where the weights are those associated with the belief pro…le generated by the preference pro…le. We show that these social welfare functions are characterized by the weak Pareto principle, a continuity axiom, and the following informational robustness property: the social ranking of two acts is una¤ected by the addition of any outcome that every individual deems at least as good as the one she originally found worst. This makes the belief-weighted Nash social welfare functions appealing in contexts where the best relevant outcome for an individual is di¢ cult to identify.
1. Introduction
Context and related work
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utility she attaches to the conceivable outcomes: she compares acts according to their subjective expected utility. Aggregating such "Savage"preferences is notoriously problematic. Mongin (1995) shows that any rule which transforms a collection of Savage preferences into a Savage social preference and respects the Pareto (indi¤erence) criterion -that is, deems two acts equally good when all individuals do-must be radically uncompromising: at most pro…les, the social preference coincides with the preference of one of the individuals.
1 In reaction to this incompatibility result, one may follow the "Savage approach" -that is, focus on aggregation rules that violate the Pareto criterion but guarantee a Savage social preference-or the "Pareto approach"-focus on rules that satisfy the Pareto criterion but need not yield a Savage social preference.
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The Savage approach is motivated by Mongin's (1997) criticism of the Pareto criterion. He argues that if two individuals agree on the comparison of two acts only because the di¤erences between their subjective beliefs compensate the di¤erences between their utilities, society should not be bound by the "spurious unanimity" of their preferences. Building on that criticism, Gilboa, Samet and Schmeidler (2004) suggest that the Pareto criterion should be respected only when the individuals agree on the probabilities of the events relevant to the uncertain prospects they compare. This weakened Pareto criterion implies that if society's preference is Savage, its utility for the outcomes is a weighted sum of its members'utilities, and its belief a weighted sum of their beliefs. Gilboa, Samuelson and Schmeidler (2014) study a di¤erent weakening of the Pareto criterion.
Relaxing the Pareto criterion makes sense if the individuals'probability measures do indeed represent their assessments of the likelihood of the events: when such assessments di¤er, a least one individual must be mistaken and society should not be compelled to respect the unanimous preferences of its members because they cannot all be well informed. In Savage's theory, however, a subjective probability measure is just an abstract system of weights. These weights may re ‡ect in part the individual's assessment of the likelihood of the events, but they may re ‡ect other subjective considerations as well. 3 This point is made, for instance, by Du¢ e (2014). In such contexts, no subjective probability measure can be wrong, and dropping the Pareto criterion is dangerous. This is the motivation for the Pareto approach. Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) establish a similar result in a multi-pro…le context. Chambers and Hayashi (2006) show that, at some pro…les, Paretian aggregation is impossible even if society's preference is only required to satisfy Savage's P3 or P4 axiom. 2 The Savage approach is often called the ex-post approach as it yields ex-post (i.e., conditional) social preferences satisfying the Pareto principle with respect to the individual ex-post preferences. Likewise, the Pareto approach is often called the ex-ante approach as it imposes the Pareto principle with respect to the individual ex-ante preferences.
3 A related di¢ culty is that a given preference satisfying Savage's axioms admits, on top of Savage's representation, multiple state-dependent expected utility representations. If utility is indeed state-dependent, then the probability measure from Savage's theorem (derived under the wrong assumption that utility is state-independent) does not correctly re ‡ect the individual's beliefs. Savage and Aumann (1987) discuss the example of a man whose wife is gravely ill. He may …nd the event that she dies very likely, yet attach a low weight to it -re ‡ecting the fact that he does not enjoy life without her. See Baccelli (2017) for a comprehensive and recent discussion. 4 We have nothing to add to the debate about the Pareto criterion under uncertainty. There is evidence Mongin (1997) shows that the Pareto criterion can be respected if society's preference is allowed to be of the state-dependent subjective expected utility type. When that is the case, Chambers and Hayashi (2006) prove that Pareto indi¤erence implies that the social utility function over the set of acts is a weighted sum of the utility functions of its members.
To the best of our knowledge, and regardless of their relative merits, neither the Savage nor the Pareto approach have so far o¤ered a complete resolution of the problem of aggregating Savage preferences. Results such as those of Gilboa, Samet and Schmeidler (2004) and Chambers and Hayashi (2006) do not tell us (i) how the individual utilities should be calibrated and (ii) how this calibration should depend on the preference pro…le. 5 Therefore, they do not de…ne a social welfare function (or SWF, for short), namely, a mapping assigning a social preference to every pro…le of individual Savage preferences. This is the criticism that Dhillon and Mertens (1999) already formulated against Harsanyi's (1955) theorem on the utilitarian aggregation of von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences over lotteries: since no restriction is imposed on how utilities are calibrated, "the 'individual utility functions'become arbitrarily complex functions of the preferences of all other individuals, making the sum-formula basically meaningless.".
Our contribution
As a partial solution to that problem, we de…ne and axiomatize the class of belief-weighted Nash SWFs. The simplest example of such a SWF uses …xed equal weights. For each Savage preference over acts, choose a 0-normalized subjective expected utility representation -one where the utility of the worst outcome for that preference is zero.
6 At any preference pro…le, rank the acts according to the product of the individual 0-normalized subjective expected utilities they yield. There are in…nitely many possible 0-normalizations for each preference but the social ranking does not change with the chosen normalizations because all 0-normalized utilities associated with a given preference are a positive multiple of each other and society's utility is their product.
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More generally, under a belief-weighted Nash SWF, an act is evaluated according to a weighted product of the individual 0-normalized subjective expected utilities it yields. The weights depend on the pro…le of beliefs of the individuals, but not on their utilities that individuals di¤er in their assessments of the likelihood of many events, and we agree that the Pareto criterion is problematic when such di¤erences exist. At the same time, we believe that a satisfactory weakening of it requires a theoretical model of behavior where the "likelihood assessment" component of an individual probability measure can be formally disentangled from its "residual" component. A recent paper that addresses this problem is Mongin and Pivato (2016) . 5 This remains true even if the weights in these representation theorems have somehow been determined. 6 In the formal analysis below, we do not assume that a worst outcome exists. Rather, we suppose that an individual's preference is representable by a bounded utility function, and the 0-normalization means that the in…mum of such a function is zero.
7 Note that the worst outcome need not be the same for all individuals, and the measure of an individual's welfare is relative to the outcome she …nds worse. This is in contrast with Nash's (1950) analysis of the bargaining problem, where the disagreement utility vector is generated by an outcome that is the same for all individuals.
for the outcomes.
Our axiomatization of this class of SWFs falls squarely in the Pareto approach. We impose the weak Pareto principle but no restriction on the social preference beyond the condition that it must be an ordering. Of course, there are many Paretian SWFs. In order to understand what makes the belief-weighted Nash SWFs special, it is instructive to …rst take a look at another natural solution: relative utilitarianism. Adapted to the context of uncertainty, relative utilitarianism compares two acts according to the sums of the (0; 1)-normalized subjective expected utilities they yield -the latter normalization consisting in assigning utility 0 to any outcome that an individual deems worst and 1 to any outcome she …nds best. 8 Observe that, in contrast to the belief-weighted Nash SWFs, a double normalization is required to obtain a well-de…ned SWF.
Under relative utilitarianism, the recommended social ranking of two acts may change with the set of outcomes that are considered relevant. In particular, it may be a¤ected by the addition of an outcome that an individual deems worse than the one she initially found worst, or better than the one she initially found best.
In many applications, identifying the worst relevant outcome for each individual may be relatively easy, but determining the best one is di¢ cult. As an illustration, consider the problem of developing medical treatment against two diseases, A and B: Let x d denote the quality of the treatment developed against disease d : say that
if a good treatment is made available, and x d = 1 if the treatment is excellent (these numbers are a convenient way of indexing the possibilities but have no meaning -we could use x d = ; ; instead). The relevant outcomes are all the pairs x = (x A ; x B ) in the set X = 0; 1 2 ; 1 0; 1 2 ; 1 :
These outcomes are uncertain and health policies may be regarded as acts mapping states of nature into X. The precise speci…cation of the set of relevant states of nature is irrelevant for the point we want to make. There are two individuals with Savage preferences over the set of acts. The speci…cation of their beliefs is also unimportant. Individual 1 su¤ers from disease A; her utility for the outcomes is given by the function u 1 (x) = x A for all x = (x A ; x B ) 2 X: Individual 2 su¤ers from disease B and her utility for the outcomes is u 2 (x) = x B for all x 2 X: Observe that, given X; the functions u 1 ; u 2 are (0; 1)-normalized: inf X u i = 0 and sup X u i = 1 for i = 1; 2: Relative utilitarianism deems the (constant acts producing in all states of nature the) outcomes ( ) equally good 9 because both 8 Relative utilitarianism was originally proposed in the context of risk. In that framework, it evaluates a lottery according to the sum of the (0; 1)-normalized von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities it generates. The criterion has received several axiomatizations: see Dhillon (1998) , Karni (1998) , Dhillon and Mertens (1999) , Segal (2000) , and Choo (2017a, 2017b) . All these papers assume that society's preference over lotteries is of the von Neumann-Morgenstern type. In the context of uncertainty, and as a corollary to Mongin's (1995) theorem, relative utilitarianism does not always produce a Savage social preference over acts. It is therefore completely unclear how the axiomatizations proposed in the context of risk could be adapted to uncertainty. 9 As usual, we identify a constant act with the outcome it yields in all states.
generate a sum of (0; 1)-normalized (subjective expected) utilities equal to 1 2 : Suppose now that, in fact, an excellent treatment cannot possibly be developed against B: The set of relevant outcomes then becomes
Given Y; the individual (0; 1)-normalized utility functions over the set of outcomes are now v 1 (x) = u 1 (x) = x A and v 2 (x) = 2u 1 (x) = 2x B : Relative utilitarianism deems (0;
1 2 ) preferable to ( 1 2 ; 0): Thus, in order to decide whether a good treatment against A (and no treatment against B) is preferable to a good treatment against B (and no treatment against A), society needs to know whether an excellent treatment against B (and A) is possible or not. There need not be anything morally wrong with this view, but it may be di¢ cult to implement in practice. In many contexts, such as the one above, the best relevant outcome for each individual is hard to determine.
In the example above, the Nash SWF (with, say, …xed equal weights) is more appealing. Because u 1 ; u 2 are 0-normalized for both X and Y (that is, inf X u i = inf Y u i = 0 for i = 1; 2), the Nash SWF deems the outcomes ( ) equally good independently of whether the set of relevant outcomes is X or Y: Of course, determining the social preference still requires a correct speci…cation of the worst relevant outcome for each individual. In many cases, this may not be an impossible task.
The example illustrates a general property of the Nash ranking: it is una¤ected by the addition of any outcome that all individuals …nd at least as good as the one they initially found worst -even if such a new outcome is better than the one they initially found best. As discussed above, this property is compelling when the best outcome for an individual cannot be determined with con…dence, an arguably frequent case. In this note, we show that the belief-weighted Nash SWFs are the only weakly Paretian SWFs satisfying this "Independence of Harmless Expansions"property and a continuity condition to be described below.
More connections with the literature
Kaneko and Nakamura (1979) axiomatize the Nash SWF for aggregating von NeumannMorgenstern preferences over lotteries. As we have seen in Sub-section 1.1, aggregating Savage preferences over acts is a quite di¤erent exercise. Indeed, the (non-degenerate) belief-weighted SWFs have no counterpart in the lottery framework. There are two further major di¤erences between Kaneko and Nakamura's work and ours. The …rst and most important one is conceptual: their analysis is restricted to problems where all individuals agree on what the worst relevant outcome is: a lottery is then evaluated according to the product of the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility gains it generates with respect to this common worst outcome. The scope of applicability of the SWFs we de…ne is much broader: they allow society to rank the relevant acts for any pro…le of Savage preferences. The second remaining di¤erence is more technical, though also important. Kaneko and Nakamura use an independence axiom embodying an assumption of neutrality which our Independence of Harmless Expansions axiom completely dispenses with.
Another related paper is West (1984) . The author considers the problem of ranking social gambles, namely, acts that return a positive amount of money to each individual if a given event occurs, and zero to everyone otherwise. In this very special context, it turns out that (the suitable version of) Pareto indi¤erence 10 is compatible with the requirement that society has well-de…ned beliefs and tastes, and the author shows that the latter requirement essentially forces a multiplicative aggregation of the individual utilities and beliefs. This argument cannot be used in our framework because of Chambers and Hayashi's (2006) impossibility results.
Framework
Let S be the set of possible states (of nature). Subsets of S are called events. Let X be an uncountable set of conceivable (social) outcomes, and let X be the set of …nite or countably in…nite subsets of X containing at least two elements. For each X 2 X , let A(X) be the set of functions from S to X: Elements of X are called relevant outcomes and elements of A(X) relevant acts. If x 2 X; we abuse notation and also use x to denote the constant act assigning outcome x to every state.
For any X 2 X , a preference over A(X) is an ordering R A(X) A(X): We call R Savage if there exist a non-constant, bounded function u : X ! R and a …nitely additive, non-atomic probability measure p on 2 S -henceforth called a belief-such that aRb , R S (u a)dp R S (u b)dp for all a; b 2 A(X): We let P denote the set of all beliefs. The function U (:; u; p) :
is a Savage representation of R: We denote by U(X; R) the set of such representations. If U (:; u; p) and U (:; v; q) are two Savage representations of R, then p = q and v = u + for some positive real number and some real number : We let p (R) denote the unique belief p 2 P such that p = p (R) for every Savage representation U (:; u; p) of R: Let R(X) denote the set of all preferences over A(X) and R (X) the subset of Savage preferences.
Let N = f1; :::; ng be a …nite set of individuals. A (social choice) problem is a list (X; R N ) where X 2 X and R N = (R 1 ; :::; R n ) 2 R (X) N : We simply call R N a preference pro…le (over A(X)) -but keep in mind that R 1 ; :::; R n are Savage preferences. The set (or domain) of all problems is denoted by D. A social welfare function (or SWF) is a mapping
A few comments are in order about the setting just described.
(1) In the spirit of Arrow (1963) , a SWF is a completely ordinal object that aggregates preference orderings: no utility information is available. We interpret R(X; R N ) as society's preference over A(X) when individual preferences are given by the pro…le R N .
In contrast to Mongin (1995) , the preference pro…le R N is variable. This variablepro…le approach has a long tradition in social choice theory where recommending a SWF is interpreted as designing a "constitution" -a fully speci…ed procedure for solving not just one but any possible preference aggregation problem. The underlying view is that, in order to avoid arbitrariness, the social decision maker must …rst commit to such a formal procedure before asking individuals to report their preferences.
Clearly, the variable-pro…le approach cannot avoid the incompatibility between the Pareto principle and collective Savage rationality. But it allows one to formulate collective rationality requirements that vary with the pro…le that society's preference summarizes. The basic idea is that society can a¤ord to be more rational when its members agree than when they do not. More on this in Subsection 5.3.
(2) In contrast to the standard Arrovian formulation, the set over which society's preference is constructed is allowed to vary. When the set of relevant outcomes expands, society's preference over the originally relevant acts is a priori allowed to change: if X X 0 and the preference pro…le R
The axiom of Independence of Harmless Expansions discussed in the Introduction and formally de…ned in the next section will restrict the extent to which society's preference is allowed to change.
Note also that society's preference is constructed on sets of acts with an at most countable range of outcomes X whereas the set of conceivable outcomes X is uncountable. That relevant alternatives always form a "small" subset of all the conceivable ones is perhaps not a bad assumption.
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(3) Society's preference over A(X) may only depend upon individual preferences over that set. This is a natural restriction because X is a large unstructured set and individual preferences over acts whose outcomes belong to X may therefore be di¢ cult to elucidate. Moreover, since no structure is imposed on X, there is no natural reference point outside A(X) which could help de…ne the social preference on A(X).
(4) Individual preferences are of the Savage type but society's preference need not be. The set of possible SWFs is therefore quite large, and axioms such as the Pareto criterion should not be expected to have much bite.
Theorem
For any X 2 X and R 2 R (X); a Savage representation U (:; u; p) of R is 0-normalized if inf X u = 0; it is (0; 1)-normalized if in addition sup X u = 1: We denote by U 0 (X; R) the set of 0-normalized Savage representations of R and by U (:; X; R) the unique (0; 1)-normalized Savage representation of R: If (X; R N ) 2 D and U i 2 U(X; R i ) for each i 2 N; de…ne U N : A(X) ! R N + by U N (a) = (U 1 (a); :::; U n (a)) for all a 2 A(X): With a slight abuse of notation, write p (R N ) := (p (R 1 ); :::; p (R n )); U(X; R N ) := Q i2N U(X; R i ); and
A SWF R is a belief-weighted Nash SWF if there is a function :
We call the weight function associated with R: Since for every U i 2 U 0 (X; R i ) there exists a positive real number i such that
Some further notation and terminology is needed to state our axiomatic characterization of the belief-weighted Nash SWFs. We let N := f1; 2; :::g denote the set of positive integers. The symbols P i and I i denote the strict preference and indi¤erence relations associated with the individual preference R i ; and P(X; R N ) and I(X; R N ) are the strict social preference and indi¤erence relations associated with R(X; R N ):
is a sequence of acts in A(X); we say that (a t ) converges to a with respect to R N if the sequence (U N (a t )) converges to
We now state the axioms used in our characterization theorem. The …rst needs no introduction; part (ii) of this axiom is known as Pareto Indi¤erence.
Weak Pareto Principle.
12 For all (X; R N ) 2 D and all a; b 2 A(X), (i) if aP i b for all i 2 N , then aP(X; R N )b; and (ii) if aI i b for all i 2 N , then aI(X; R N )b:
The second axiom plays a central role in our characterization. 12 The Weak Pareto Principle is often called the ex-ante Pareto axiom as it requires unanimity with respect to the individuals' ex-ante preferences (over acts). It is stronger than the ex-post Pareto axiom which only requires unanimity with respect to the individuals'ex-post preferences (over outcomes).
Independence of Harmless Expansions. For all
N coincides with R N on A(X); and (iii) for all x 0 2 X 0 and i 2 N there exists some
The motivation for this axiom was already presented in the Introduction. Although the SWF R is requested to produce a social ordering for every problem in D, the social decision maker may in fact be uncertain about the correct speci…cation of the problem she is facing. The axiom assumes that this indeed occurs when two problems (X; R N ); (X 0 ; R 0 N ) are related by conditions (i), (ii), and (iii). Since the decision maker is unable to assert whether the correct formulation is (X;
Independence of Harmless Expansions is an independence condition very much akin to Arrow's Independence of Irrelevant alternatives. Indeed, Arrow's axiom in our setting would correspond to the statement obtained by dropping proviso (iii) in our axiom.
Independence of Harmless Expansions is also related to Dhillon and Mertens' (1999) Independence of Redundant Alternatives. In our framework, the latter axiom would require that if (i) X X 0 ; (ii) R 0 N coincides with R N on A(X); and (iii') for all x 0 2 X 0 there exists some x 2 X such that
This is a weaker axiom than Independence of Harmless Expansions because condition (iii') is more restrictive than (iii) in two respects: it imposes not only that, for each individual, each outcome x 0 in X 0 be at least as good as the worst outcome in X, but that there be a common outcome in X that all individuals deem equivalent to x 0 : Our axiom is also related to Kaneko and Nakamura's (1979) Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with Neutral Property. The latter is a stronger and rather complicated axiom that mixes the same independence condition as ours with the requirement that the names of the outcomes should not a¤ect the social ordering.
Finally, it may be worth pointing out the apparent similarity between our axiom and Nash's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. This similarity is misleading because the objects on which the conditions are formulated are very di¤erent. As a matter of fact, the primary role of Nash's independence axiom is to establish that the solution to the bargaining problem must be maximizing some underlying ordering de…ned over utility space; the fact that this ordering is the product ordering follows from Nash's scale invariance axiom, not from his independence axiom. By contrast, Independence of Harmless Expansions is the axiom responsible for the product form in our characterization.
Our third axiom requires a form of continuity of the social preference at every given preference pro…le. It does not impose any restriction across pro…les.
Continuity. For all (X; R N ) 2 D; all a; b 2 A(X); and every sequence (a t ) in A(X) converging to a with respect to R N ; (i) if a t R(X; R N )b for all t 2 N; then aR(X; R N )b; and (ii) if bR(X; R N )a t for all t 2 N; then bR(X; R N )a:
Theorem. A SWF satis…es the Weak Pareto Principle, Independence of Harmless Expansions, and Continuity if and only if it is a belief-weighted Nash SWF.
We emphasize that our axioms perform three tasks: (i) they force us to use 0-normalized Savage representations of the individual preferences at all preference pro…les 13 , (ii) they imply that social welfare is a weighted product of these individual 0-normalized Savage utilities, and (iii) they imply that the weights attached to the individual Savage utilities can only depend on the pro…le of beliefs. The only (but important) remaining indeterminacy lies in the choice of the function that computes the weights for every pro…le of beliefs. This indeterminacy can be somewhat reduced by imposing further axioms: see Section 5.3 for a discussion.
Proof
In order to prove our theorem, we begin with a lemma showing that Pareto Indi¤erence and Independence of Harmless Expansions imply a strong form of outcome neutrality.
14 Let (X) denote the set of bijections from X into itself. If (X; R N ) 2 D; 2 (X); a 2 A(X), and R N 2 R (X) N ; let a 2 A( (X)) be the act given by a (s) = (a(s)) for all s 2 S, and denote by R N the preference pro…le on A( (X)) given by a R i b , aR i b for all i 2 N and all a; b 2 A(X):
Lemma. If a SWF satis…es Pareto Indi¤erence and Independence of Harmless Expansions, then it satis…es Outcome Neutrality. Step
Let X = X [ (X): For each i 2 N , let R i be the Savage preference over A(X) which coincides with R i on A(X) and is such that xI i (x) for all x 2 X: This is well de…ned because (X) \ X = ;: Observe that p (R i ) = p (R i ) and R i coincides with R i on A( (X)): Moreover, for all x 2 X and i 2 N; there exists some x i 2 X such that xR i x i : just take x i = x if x 2 X and For all x 2 X and i 2 N; there exists some x i 2 (X) such that xR i x i . Since R N coincides with R N on A( (X)); (4.3) and Independence of Harmless Expansions therefore imply a R( (X); R N )b :
Step 2. a R( (X); R N )b :
Choose 2 (X) such that (X) \ X = (X) \ (X) = ;: This is possible because X is uncountable. By Step 1, (4.1) implies
Next consider the bijection 1 2 (X): Since ( 1 )( (X)) \ (X) = ;, Step 1 and
Proof of the theorem. The proof of the "if"statement is straightforward. To prove the converse statement, …x a SWF R satisfying the Weak Pareto Principle, Independence of Harmless Expansions, and Continuity. This SWF satis…es Pareto Indi¤erence, hence also Outcome Neutrality, by the above lemma. Replacing A(X) with X in statements (i) and (ii) yields an equivalent de…nition of the relations p N ; p N ; and % p N ; and we will freely use both de…nitions in the remainder of the proof. To check that the two formulations are indeed equivalent, …x p N 2 P N , v; w 2 R N + ; and suppose there exist (X; R N ) 2 D(p N ); U N 2 U 0 (X; R N ), and a; b 2 A(X) such that U N (a) = v; U N (b) = w; and aP(X; R N )b (respectively, aI(X; R N )b). We must
are well de…ned because of our convention to identify an outcome with the constant act assigning that outcome to every state of nature.
To do this, simply choose any two distinct outcomes x; y 2 X n X and de…ne X 0 = X [ fx; yg : For each i 2 N; let R 0 i be the Savage preference on A(X 0 ) which coincides with R i on A(X) and is such that xI 
, and we are done.
Step 1. For all p N 2 P N ; (i) the binary relation % p N is an ordering, and (ii) for all v; w 2 R N + one and only one of the following statements holds:
Fix a belief pro…le p N 2 P N :
To prove re ‡exivity and completeness of % p N , …x two (possibly equal) vectors v; w 2 R N + : Let x 0 ; x 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 2 X be four distinct outcomes and let X = fx 0 ; x 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 g : For each i 2 N; choose a number z i 2 R + such that z i 6 = v i ; w i ; de…ne u i : X ! R + by u i (x 0 ) = 0; u i (x 1 ) = v i ; u i (x 2 ) = w i ; and u i (x 3 ) = z i : De…ne U i : A(X) ! R + by U i (a) = U (a; u i ; p i ) = R S (u i a)dp i for all a 2 A(X); and let R i be the preference on A(X) represented by U i : by construction, R i 2 R (X) and p (R i ) = p i . Letting U N := (U 1 ; :::; U n ) and R N = (R 1 ; :::; R n ); we have (X; R N ) 2 D(p N ) and U N 2 U 0 (X; R N ): Since R(X; R N ) is complete and re ‡exive, we must have x 1 R(X; R N )x 2 or x 2 R(X; R N )x 1 : Since U N (x 1 ) = v and U N (x 2 ) = w; we have v % p N w or w % p N v:
and
By Outcome Neutrality and because X is uncountable, we may assume that
(u i a)dp i for all a 2 A(X): Let R i be the Savage preference on A(X) represented by U i ; let U N = (U 1 ; :::; U n ); and let R N = (R 1 ; :::; R n ): Note that R N coincides with R On the other hand, (4.6) and (4.8) imply y 1 I i x 2 for all i 2 N , hence by Pareto Indi¤erence,
Transitivity of R(X; R N ) now implies
This establishes the transitivity of % p N and completes the proof of statement (i) in Step 1.
The proof of statement (ii) is similar to the proof of transitivity and omitted for brevity.
Step 2. For all p N 2 P N there exists 2 N such that, for all v; w 2 R
Note that the number in the above statement may vary with p N : To prove that statement, …x p N 2 P N . In order to alleviate notation, we write ; ; and % instead of p N ; p N ; and % p N : We use ; >; to write inequalities in R N + : We begin by establishing three properties of % : The …rst, scale invariance, is key to the multiplicative form of the SWFs satisfying our axioms.
Step 2.1. % is scale invariant: v % w , v % w for all 2 R N ++ ; where v = ( 1 v 1 ; :::; n v n ):
To check this point, …x v; w 2 R N + ; 2 R N ++ ; and suppose v w (respectively, v w). By de…nition, there exist (X; R N ) 2 D(p N ); U N 2 U 0 (X; R N ); and a; b 2 A(X) such that U N (a) = v; U N (b) = w; and aP(X; R N )b (respectively, aI(X; R N )b). For each i 2 N; de…ne V i : A(X) ! R + by V i (c) = i U i (c) for all c 2 A(X); and let V N = (V 1 ; :::; V n ):
Since (X; R N ) 2 D(p N ) and aP(X; R N )b (respectively, aI(X; R N )b), the de…nition of (respectively, ) implies v w (respectively, v w), as desired.
Step 2.2. % is weakly monotonic: v w ) v w:
This follows immediately from the fact that R satis…es (part (i) of) the Weak Pareto Principle.
Step 2.3. % is continuous: for all u; v 2 R 
By Outcome Neutrality and because X is uncountable, we may assume that X t \X t 0 = ; for all distinct t; t 0 2 N [ f0g :
where t(x) is the unique integer t 2 N [ f0g such that x 2 X t :
(u i a)dp i for all a 2 A(X): Let R i be the Savage preference on A(X) represented by U i ; let U N = (U 1 ; :::; U n ); and let R N = (R 1 ; :::; R n ): Note that R N coincides with R
Moreover, for all x 2 X; all t 2 N[f0g ; and all i 2 N; there is some x t i 2 X t such that xR i x t i : Applying Independence of Harmless Expansions to (4.9), we get x t R(X; R N )y t for all t 2 N: (4.11)
Since U N (y t ) = v for all t 2 N [ f0g, we have y t I i y 0 for all t 2 N [ f0g and all i 2 N: From (4.11) and Pareto Indi¤erence,
That is, the sequence (x t ) in A(X) converges to x 0 with respect to R N : Because R satis…es Continuity, (4.12) now implies x 0 R(X; R N )y 0 : Since (X; R N ) 2 D(p N ); U N 2 U 0 (X; R N ), and U N (x 0 ) = u and U N (y 0 ) = v; the de…nition of % yields u % v:
Step 2.4. There exists 2 N such that, for all v; w 2 R
Since % is continuous, it admits a continuous numerical representation: there exists a continuous function W :
Because % is scale-invariant and weakly monotonic, we have that for all v; w 2 R N + and all
By a theorem of Osborne (1976) , properties (i) and (iii) imply that there exist nonnegative real numbers 1 ; :::; n and an increasing function g :
Since in our case W also satis…es (ii), not all the numbers 1 ; :::; n can be zero, and we may assume without loss of generality that = ( 1 ; :::; n ) 2 N :
This completes the proof of Step 2.
Since p N was arbitrary in the argument above, we have proved that there exists a function : P N ! N such that, for every p N 2 P N and all v; w 2 R
Step 3. For all (X; R N ) 2 D and all a; b 2 A(X); we have
; and the de…nition of % p (R N ) (and the fact that it is an ordering) implies that aR(X; R N )b:
Step 2 implies
A general comment is in order about the proof. Because the argument given above works for any …xed pro…le of beliefs, the theorem remains true on the subdomain of preference pro…les over acts where the beliefs of all agents are the same. This means that the result can be reformulated in the context of the aggregation of von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences over lotteries: properly rewritten, our axioms characterize the (exogenously) weighted 0-normalized Nash SWFs in that context, and Anonymity easily pins down the uniform 0-normalized Nash SWF. It is instructive to compare this variant of our result with Dhillon and Mertens'(1999) characterization of relative utilitarianism: dropping the requirement that society's preference be von Neumann-Morgenstern and strengthening Independence of Redundant Alternatives to Independence of Harmless Alternatives leads us to give up relative utilitarianism in favor of 0-normalized Nash welfarism.
Discussion
This section addresses three criticisms that may be formulated against the belief-weighted Nash SWFs.
Lack of rationality?
In this subsection, we …x the set of relevant outcomes X and drop it from our notation whenever there is no risk of confusion. Thus, we write A instead of A(X) for the set of relevant acts, and a problem (X; R N ) reduces to its pro…le component R N :
Perhaps the main drawback of a belief-weighted Nash SWF (henceforth simply called a Nash SWF) is that the social preference it recommends (henceforth called a Nash preference) may not be of the Savage type. More precisely: if R is a Nash SWF that never puts weight one on a single agent's belief (i.e., (p (R N )) 1 for all pro…les R N ), then there exist pro…les R N where R(R N ) is not a Savage preference. This is problematic because Savage's axioms are generally regarded as criteria of rationality in the face of uncertainty.
In order to assess the severity of this problem, it is important to examine (i) which of Savage's axioms may be violated by a Nash preference, and (ii) whether these axioms are compelling for a social preference.
Let us begin by recalling Savage's axiomatic system. Let R be a preference relation on A. For all a; b 2 A and E S, de…ne the act a E b by (a E b)(s) = a(s) if s 2 E and (a E b)(s) = b(s) otherwise. Call an event E R-null if a E c I b E c for all a; b; c 2 A, and let E + (R) be the set of events which are not R-null. For all E S; de…ne the relation R E on A by aR E b , [aRb and a(s) = b(s) for all s 2 S n E] : Savage's axioms are:
(P1) R is an ordering, (P2) for all a; b; c; c
(P3) for all x; y 2 X; all a 2 A; and all E 2 E + (R); xRy , x E a R y E a;
(P4) for all x; x 0 ; y; y 0 2 X such that xP y and x 0 P y 0 ; and for all E; E
(P5) there exist a; b 2 A such that aP b; (P6) for all a; b; c 2 A such that aP b; there is a partition fE 1 ; :::; E n g of S such that c E i a P b and a P c E i b for i = 1; :::; n; (P7) for all a; b 2 A and all E S;
Let us examine which of these axioms may be violated by a Nash preference. For simplicity, let us assume that N = f1; 2g and let R be the uniform Nash SWF ranking acts according to the (uniformly weighted) product of their (0; 1)-normalized utilities.
The very basic axiom (P1) poses no problem: R(R f1;2g ) is an ordering for every pro…le R f1;2g : One can also check that the somewhat technical conditions (P5) to (P7) are satis…ed by R(R f1;2g ) at every R f1;2g :
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On the other hand, R(R f1;2g ) violates each of the separability axioms (P2) to (P4) at some pro…le R f1;2g : To see that (P2) need not hold, let x; y 2 X, E S; and suppose R f1;2g is such that p (R i )(E) = 1 2 for i = 1; 2 and U (x; R 1 ) = 1; U (y; R 1 ) = 0; U (x; R 2 ) = 0; U (y; R 2 ) = 1:
15 The preference R(R f1;2g ) satis…es (P5) because the function (w 1 ; w 2 ) 7 ! u 1 u 2 is strictly quasi-concave
; so that x E y P(R f1;2g ) y E y = y and y E x P(R f1;2g ) x E x = x, a violation of (P2) (with c = y and c 0 = x). Since R satis…es the Weak Pareto Principle, we know from Chambers and Hayashi (2006) that violations of (P3) and (P4) must occur. For the sake of completeness, we quickly provide examples of such violations.
To see that (P3) may fail, let x; y; z 2 X, E S; and suppose R f1;2g is such that p (R i )(E) = 1 2 for i = 1; 2 and U (y; R 1 ) = 0; U (x; R 1 ) = 1 2 ; U (z; R 1 ) = 1; U (y; R 2 ) = 1; U (x; R 2 ) = 1 2 ; U (z; R 2 ) = 0:
; so that xP(R f1;2g )y and y E z P(R f1;2g ) x E z. Since the latter preference implies that E 2 E + (R(R f1;2g )), R(R f1;2g ) violates (P3). For a violation of (P4), let x; y; y 0 2 X; E S; and suppose R f1;2g is such that
; and
U (y; R 2 ) = 0; U (x; R 2 ) = 1 2 ; U (y 0 ; R 2 ) = 1:
); so that x E y P(R f1;2g ) x E 0 y and
Savage proposed axioms (P1) to (P7) as rationality criteria applicable to an individual preference relation. We would like to argue that the relevance of these axioms should be reexamined if R is a social preference. The reason is that such a preference is not a primitive concept; rather, it is constructed from a pro…le of individual preferences through a SWF: R = R(R N ): Therefore, (a) the appeal of an axiom imposed on a social preference R = R(R N ) may well depend upon the preference pro…le R N that R summarizes, and (b) the preference pro…le R N itself may have to enter into the proper formulation of an axiom imposed on the social preference R(R N ):
As an elementary illustration of claim (a), suppose X = fx; yg and N = f1; 2g : If R f1;2g is a pro…le such that xP 1 y; yP 2 x; and p (R 1 ) = p (R 2 ); it is unclear whether (P5) should be imposed on R(R f1;2g ): Note in particular that the popular relative utilitarian SWF (which ranks acts according to the sum of the (0; 1)-normalized utilities they generate) indeed deems all acts equally good at R f1;2g : ; which of course is a Savage preference. We focused on (P5) for simplicity but, as we will see later, claim (a) also applies to the other Savage axioms.
We now come to claim (b). Savage's separability axioms (P2) to (P4) are restrictions of the following type: "if an act a is weakly preferred to an act b; and if acts a 0 ; b 0 are suitably related to a; b; then a 0 should be weakly preferred to b 0 ". We claim that in a social decision context, simply knowing that "a is weakly preferred to b"may not be informative enough to conclude that "a 0 should also be weakly preferred to b 0 ". Indeed, a social preference summarizes an entire pro…le of individual preferences; this pro…le is the reason why a is weakly preferred to b and it may not be wise to ignore it when deciding whether society should also weakly prefer a 0 to b 0 : Consider our earlier example of a violation of (P2). Given the pro…le R f1;2g described in that example, a sensible motivation for the social preference a E b P(R f1;2g ) b is that act a E b o¤ers both individuals a chance to get their favorite outcome whereas b yields individual 1 0 s favorite outcome -which is also 2's worst-in all states. Ex-ante, a E b appears more equitable than b:
16 But the social preference a P(R f1;2g ) b E a, which (P2) then prescribes, cannot be justi…ed on similar grounds -indeed, the opposite preference is supported by the same fairness considerations. This suggests that (P2) may not be a reasonable restriction on R(R f1;2g ):
On the other hand, at a pro…le R 
completely natural -and indeed satis…ed by any Nash SWF R: A plausible reason for the social preference a E b P(R 0 f1;2g ) b E b is that both individuals prefer the former act to the latter, and this same reason justi…es the preference a E a P(R 0 f1;2g ) b E a: This discussion again backs claim (a) -but also claim (b): the preference pro…le itself may have to enter the premise of an axiom bearing on the social preference that summarizes it. In that spirit, here is a variant of (P2) which the Nash SWFs satisfy.
(WP2) for all a; b; c; c 0 2 A; all E S; and all R N such that
This is admittedly a much weaker separability condition but we believe it lies on safer grounds than (P2). The restriction assumed on R N is meant to guarantee that the reason behind the social preference between a E c and b E c also justi…es the preference between a E c 0 and b E c 0 :
Axiom (P4) admits a particularly interesting variant. Denote by W (R i ) = fx 2 X j yR i x for all y 2 Xg the set of worst outcomes according to the preference R i ; and consider the following requirement:
(WP4) for all x; x 0 ; y; y 0 2 X; all E; E 0 S; and all R N such that
An outcome in \ i2N W (R i ) is everybody's worst: call it bad (at R N ). An outcome not in [ i2N W (R i ) is nobody's worst: call it good (at R N ). Axiom (WP4) requires that society's preference between two binary acts that yield either a good outcome or a bad outcome should be independent of the speci…cation of these two outcomes.
A SWF R satisfying (WP4) generates at each pro…le R N a well-de…ned likelihood relation % (R N ; R) on the set of events:
The interpretation of the statement E % (R N ; R) E 0 is that, at R N ; society believes that event E is at least as likely as event E 0 : this interpretation makes sense because society always weakly prefers a good outcome if E occurs and a bad outcome otherwise to a good outcome if E 0 occurs and a bad outcome otherwise. If R satis…es (WP4), the binary relation % (R N ; R) is transitive for every pro…le R N .
17
Of course, at a pro…le R N where no good outcome exists ([ i2N W (R i ) = X) or no bad outcome exists (\ i2N W (R i ) = ?), (5.1) implies that E (R N ; R) E 0 for all E; E 0 : society's belief is completely indeterminate.
Interestingly, the Nash SWFs satisfy WP4. To see this, consider for simplicity the uniform Nash SWF R and observe that if x is a good outcome at R N and y is a bad outcome at R N , then for any event E;
because U (y; R i ) = 0 for all i 2 N: It follows that for any good outcomes x; x 0 ; any bad outcomes y; y 0 ; and any two events E; E 0 ;
as desired. 17 This follows directly from the transitivity of the social preference relation R(R N ) : for any events E; E 0 ; E 00 such that E % (R N ; R) E 0 % (R N ; R) E 00 we have x E y R(R N ) x E 0 y R(R N ) x E 00 y; hence x E y R(R N ) x E 00 y, for every good outcome x at R N and every bad outcome y at R N ; implying E % (R N ; R) E 00 :
At any pro…le R N where a good outcome and a bad outcome exist, the social likelihood relation generated by the uniform Nash SWF R takes a simple form. From (5.1) and (5.2),
The social likelihood of an event is the product of the probabilities attached to it by the individuals. Society's belief % (R N ; R) cannot generally be represented by a probability measure but it is an ordering on 2 S . A subtle aspect of the above construction is that two social beliefs % (R N ; R); % (R 0 N ; R) may di¤er even if the social preferences R(R N ), R(R 0 N ) coincide. A social belief is not a property of a social preference per se; it depends explicitly on the pro…le that generates this preference through the SWF.
As an illustration, suppose N = f1; 2g ; X = fx; yg ; and R is the uniform Nash SWF. Consider …rst a unanimous pro…le R f1;2g : In such a pro…le, agents have identical beliefs: p (R 1 ) = p (R 2 ) = p: Suppose xR i y for i = 1; 2: Since X only contains the two outcomes x; y; an act a is completely described by the event E a = fs 2 S j a(s) = xg : For any two acts a; b; we have aR i b , p(E a ) p(E b ) for i = 1; 2 and the social preference at R f1;2g coincides with the common preference of the individuals:
Using (5.3), the social likelihood relation generated by R at R f1;2g is given by
that is, society's belief coincides with the common probabilistic belief of its members. Consider next a pro…le R 0 f1;2g where individuals have "opposite beliefs" and "opposite tastes":
2 )(S n E) = p(E) for every event E; U (x; R 0 1 ) = 1; U (y; R 0 1 ) = 0; and U (x; R 0 2 ) = 0; U (y; R 0 2 ) = 1: For all acts a; b; the social preference at R f1;2g is given by
2 ) = X the social likelihood relation generated by R at R f1;2g is indeterminate:
so that % (R f1;2g ; R) 6 = % (R f1;2g ; R): Upon re ‡ection, this does seem right and (WP4) may be a good alternative to imposing (P4) on the social preference at all pro…les. Imposing Savage's axioms at every pro…le not only yields a well-de…ned probabilistic social belief, but also forces that belief to be the same at all pro…les that generate the same social preference. However, as the above example shows, a given social preference may summarize two preference pro…les with radically di¤erent belief components -provided these di¤erences are "o¤set"by countervailing di¤erences in tastes. Clearly, one cannot expect the same social belief to aggregate both of these belief pro…les well.
To conclude, let us brie ‡y take stock: (i) the social preference recommended by a Nash SWF at a given pro…le always satis…es Savage's fundamental axiom (P1) but may violate each of (P2) to (P4) -it does satisfy all axioms when that pro…le is unanimous; (ii) there are pro…les where it may not be wise to expect the social preference to satisfy axioms (P2) to (P4); (iii) pro…le-dependent variants of Savage's axioms can be de…ned -the Nash SWFs satisfy a variant of (P4) guaranteeing a well-de…ned, non-degenerate (but non-probabilistic) social belief at all pro…les where a "good"outcome and a "bad"outcome exist.
Social preference reversals under harmful expansions of the outcome set
Independence of Harmless Expansions guarantees that the social ranking of two acts is una¤ected by the addition of an outcome that all individuals …nd at least as good as the one they initially found worst. It does not prevent the social ranking to be a¤ected by the addition of an outcome that some agent …nds worse than all initially relevant outcomes -a harmful expansion.
Such social preference reversals do occur under the Nash SWFs. The following example illustrates the possible extent of the phenomenon.
Let N = f1; 2g and X = fx; yg ; so that an act a 2 A(X) is completely determined by the set E a := fs 2 S j a(s) = xg : Let R 1 ; R 2 be Savage preferences over A(X) such that xP 1 y; yP 2 x; and p (R 1 ) = p (R 2 ) = p: Under the uniform Nash SWF, the social preference at R f1;2g is represented by a social utility function U ( ; X; R f1;2g ) that is the product of the (0; 1)-normalized utilities of the individuals. Since U (x; X; R 1 ) = U (y; X; R 2 ) = 1 and U (y; X; R 1 ) = U (x; X; R 2 ) = 0;
for all a 2 A(X): Social utility is single-peaked in p(E a ); the probability that the act a yields outcome x; with peak at p(E a ) = 1 2 : Let now X 0 = fx; y; zg and let R 0 1 ; R 0 2 be Savage preferences over A(X 0 ) such that U (x; X 0 ; R 1 ) = 1; U (y; X 0 ; R 1 ) = 1 "; U (z; X 0 ; R 1 ) = 0;
U (x; X 0 ; R 2 ) = 0; U (y; X 0 ; R 2 ) = "; U (z; X 0 ; R 2 ) = 1;
where 0 < " < 1 2
; and p (R
Notice that the pro…le R 0 f1;2g coincides with R f1;2g on A(X) and individual 1 …nds the new outcome z worse than all previously relevant outcomes. For every a 2 A(X) (a binary act with outcome in X = fx; yg), the social utility of a at R 0 f1;2g is
Since 0 < " < 1 2
; social utility is now decreasing in the probability that a yields outcome x: In particular, the social ranking of all acts for which this probability is below 1 2 is reversed.
It should be stressed that such reversals are not proper to the Nash SWFs. Indeed, an obvious corollary to our Theorem is that no SWF satis…es the Weak Pareto Principle, the full independence axiom obtained by dropping proviso (iii) from the premise of Independence of Harmless Expansions, and Continuity. This impossibility may be interpreted as a version of Arrow's theorem in the context of aggregation of Savage preferences.
However, it is possible to guarantee that society's preference is una¤ected by a harmful expansion if the latter is also useless, i.e., if no individual …nds the new outcome better than all the initially relevant ones. Speci…cally, consider the following axiom: ( U (a; X; R i ))
Contrary to the Nash SWFs, these dual Nash SWFs are unattractive from the point of view of fairness. Because the function (w 1 ; :::; w n ) 7 ! Q i2N ( w) c i i is strictly quasiconvex on [ 1; 0) N (when c 0), the corresponding SWF is "equality-averse". As an illustration, suppose N = f1; 2g ; X = fx; yg ; let R be the uniform dual Nash SWF, and let R f1;2g be a pro…le such that p (R 1 ) = p (R 2 ) = p and U (x; X; R 1 ) = U (y; X; R 2 ) = 0 and U (y; X; R 1 ) = U (x; X; R 2 ) = 1: Then ( U (x; X; R 1 ))( U (x; X; R 2 )) = 0 whereas for any event E such that 0 < p(E) < 1; ( U (x E y; X; R 1 ))( U (x E y; X; R 2 )) = (1 p(E))(p(E));
hence, x P(X; R f1;2g )x E y: Society prefers x; which yields individual 1's favorite and 2's worst outcome in all states, to x E y; which gives each individual a chance to get her best outcome.
Indeterminacy -and how to reduce it
The weight function associated with a belief-weighted Nash SWF R is not constrained by the three axioms in the Theorem. Restrictions on may be obtained by imposing further axioms on R: We explore here the consequences of Anonymity and State Neutrality. The former is the usual requirement that the social preference should not be a¤ected by a relabeling of the individuals. The latter is a new axiom saying that the labeling of the states of nature should be irrelevant.
Some notation is needed to de…ne these properties. Let (N ) be the set of bijections from N into itself and let (S) be the set of bijections from S into itself. For any X 2 X ; 2 (N ); p N 2 P N ; R N 2 R(X) N ; and z 2 N ; de…ne p N 2 P N ; R N 2 R(X) N ; and z 2 N by p (i) = p i ; R (i) = R i ; and z (i) = z i for all i 2 N:
Anonymity. For all (X; R N ) 2 D and 2 (N ); R(X; R N ) = R(X; R N ):
For any X 2 X ; 2 (S); a 2 A(X); p 2 P; and R 2 R(X); de…ne a 2 A(X) by ( a)( (s)) = a(s) for all s 2 S; de…ne p 2 P by ( p)( (E)) = p(E) for all E S; and de…ne R 2 R(X) by a R b , aRb for all a; b 2 A(X): If p N 2 P N and R N 2 R(X) N ; let p N = ( p 1 ; :::; p n ) and R N = ( R 1 ; :::; R n ):
State Neutrality. For all (X; R N ) 2 D and 2 (S); R(X; R N ) = R(X; R N ):
A more explicit formulation of the statement R(X; R N ) = R(X; R N ) reads aR(X; R N )b , a R(X; R N ) b for all a; b 2 A(X): This means that permuting states of nature yields a correspondingly permuted social ranking of the acts. Note that since constant acts are unchanged under any permutation of the states, State Neutrality implies that the social ranking of constant acts is una¤ected by a relabeling of the states: xR(X; R N )y , xR(X; R N )y for all x; y 2 X:
Call a weight function symmetric if ( p N ) = (p N ) for all p N 2 P N and all 2 (N ) and call it invariant (under state relabeling) if ( p N ) = (p N ) for all p N 2 P N and all 2 (S):
Proposition. If R is a belief-weighted Nash SWF with associated weight function , then (a) R satis…es Anonymity if and only if is symmetric, (b) R satis…es State Neutrality if and only if is invariant.
Proof. Let R be a belief-weighted Nash SWF with associated weight function : The "if" part of statements (a) and (b) is easy to check.
Step 1. To prove the "only if"part of statement (a), let us assume that is not symmetric and show that R violates Anonymity. Since is not symmetric, there exist p N 2 P N ; 2 (N ); and i; j 2 N such that 1 n ) for every p N 2 P N : For each i 2 N and p N 2 P N ; let N (i; p N ) = fj 2 N j p j = p i g and de…ne
Under this function , the weight attached to an individual's utility is proportional to the number of individuals sharing her belief. We do not claim that the resulting Nash SWF is appealing, and it is clear that symmetric and invariant weight functions which favor eccentric (rather than popular) beliefs can also be constructed. What the example does show is that a defense of the uniform Nash SWF (corresponding to (p N ) = ( 1 n ; :::; 1 n ) for every p N 2 P N ) requires going beyond traditional symmetry and invariance requirements.
